— On the Systematic Co-optation of Buddhist Critical Spirit by the “Progress Narrative,” with a Critique of the Extreme of the “Rupture Narrative”
Abstract: This paper offers a systematic critique of the three-stage progress narrative of apoha theory—“negation → affirmation → synthesis”—which describes the development from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s “pure negation,” through Śāntarakṣita’s “implicit affirmation,” to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti’s “negation-qualified affirmation” as the “maturation” of conceptual cognition (vikalpa-jñāna). This narrative conceals the real tensions and compromises in intellectual history. Drawing on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’s “cessation of mental activity and verbal expression” and Candrakīrti’s “only refutation, no establishment; only negation, no positive predication” , this paper argues that “pure negation” is not a preliminary stage to be superseded, but a critical stance deeply resonant with Madhyamaka’s deconstructive spirit. Taking the Mahāyānasaṃgraha’s apophatic definition of non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna) as “free from five aspects” as a reference point, this paper further argues that the so-called “maturation of conceptual cognition” conflates the fundamental distinction between “dominant condition” (adhipati-pratyaya) and “direct cause” (kāraṇa-hetu). However, this paper also self-consciously avoids the trap of the “rupture narrative.” Nāgārjuna refutes the four extremes (catuṣkoṭi): the progress narrative falls into eternalism (śāśvata), while the rupture narrative falls into nihilism (uccheda). The final position of this paper is: the conceptual and the non-conceptual are neither identical nor different —in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), conceptual cognition is a necessary expedient; in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), conceptualization itself is quiescent. To say it is “necessary” and to say it is “quiescent” is to speak of two sides of the same reality. All assertions in this paper are apophatic rather than cataphatic; they are medicines for specific attachments, not descriptions of reality.
Keywords: apoha; conceptual cognition; non-conceptual wisdom; Madhyamaka; Yogācāra; āśraya-parāvṛtti; neither identical nor different
I. Introduction: A Narrative Requiring Double Apophasis
In the study of Indian Buddhist epistemology and philosophy of language, the “three-stage theory” of apoha is widely circulated: the first stage, represented by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, holds that the meaning of a word is “pure negation”; the second stage, represented by Śāntarakṣita, holds that negation implicitly contains affirmation; the third stage, represented by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, holds that apoha is “negation-qualified affirmation.” Scholars further describe this development as the “self-deepening of conceptual cognition”—from pure negation, to affirmation within negation, to the dialectical unity of affirmation and negation, as the process of conceptual cognition moving from “immaturity” to “maturity.”
This narrative relies on a recent scholarly construction in philological terms and conceals Dharmakīrti’s independent contribution and synchronic doctrinal divergences in intellectual history. But the more fundamental problem is this: it elevates a teleological framework requiring scrutiny to the status of an almost axiomatic systematic thesis. From Dignāga’s “pure negation” to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti’s “negation-qualified affirmation,” apoha gradually transforms from a critical tool dismantling realist presuppositions into a “theory of meaning” safely accommodated within an affirmative framework. Negation is not “deepened” but “domesticated.”
However, if the critique of the “progress narrative” substitutes a “rupture narrative,” it merely falls into the opposite extreme. Nāgārjuna refutes the four extremes in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence. The progress narrative falls into eternalism (śāśvata); the rupture narrative falls into nihilism (uccheda). The critique in this paper must simultaneously avoid both extremes.
Therefore, the argumentative strategy of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to reveal how the “progress narrative” domesticates “negation” from a critical tool into an appendage of an affirmative framework; on the other hand, to avoid absolutizing “rupture” into another teleology, taking “neither identical nor different” as its methodological foundation. The core assertion of this paper is: the necessity of conceptual cognition does not equal its legitimacy; but the necessity of conceptual cognition also does not equal its illegitimacy. In conventional truth, conceptual cognition is a necessary expedient; in ultimate truth, it is quiescent. To say it is “necessary” and to say it is “quiescent” is to speak of two sides of the same reality—this is precisely the meaning of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’s “Whatever is dependently originated, I say is emptiness; it is also a provisional designation; it is also the meaning of the middle way.”
All assertions in this paper are apophatic rather than cataphatic. They are medicines for specific attachments, not descriptions of reality.
II. The Critical Edge of “Pure Negation”: Its Deep Resonance with Madhyamaka’s Deconstructive Spirit and Its Limits
To understand why “pure negation” should not be regarded as a preliminary stage to be superseded, one must return to the original motivation behind Dignāga’s establishment of apoha theory. Dignāga’s apoha theory is not an isolated proposition in philosophy of language, but a core component of his nominalist stance. In the sixth century, realist schools such as the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya held that the meaning of a word derives from the real existence of universals (sāmānya). Dignāga’s response was: the meaning of a word does not derive from any “really existing universal,” but from “the exclusion of others.” The critical force of this position lies in its radical dismantling of the “correspondence theory” presupposition between language and reality.
This position resonates deeply with Madhyamaka’s deconstructive principle. Nāgārjuna explicitly declares in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Chapter on the Analysis of the Dharma:
“The ultimate reality of all dharmas is the cessation of mental activity and verbal expression; it is unborn and unceasing, quiescent like nirvāṇa.”
Pingala’s commentary points out that “the Buddha teaches the ultimate reality of all dharmas; in ultimate reality there is no path of language, and all mental activities are extinguished,” because “the mind arises from grasping at characteristics” and “cannot truly see all dharmas.” Nāgārjuna’s position does not deny the validity of language at the conventional level, but points out: language and the mental activities (conceptualization) on which it depends must be quiescent at the level of “the ultimate reality of all dharmas.”
Candrakīrti’s implementation of this position in the Madhyamakāvatāra is even more thorough. He explicitly maintains that “of refutation and establishment, there is only refutation; at the limit of reality, there is no refutation or establishment.” Candrakīrti’s reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) does not establish any positive thesis. Buddhapālita inherited Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva’s tradition of refuting without establishing, taking Nāgārjuna’s emptiness as “negation, not affirmation.” What Candrakīrti refutes is all “establishment,” regardless of its content. To describe Candrakīrti’s reductio as “the supreme exercise of conceptual cognition” is precisely a description Candrakīrti himself would reject.
However, there exists an insurmountable limit between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory and Madhyamaka’s deconstructive spirit. Dharmakīrti explicitly acknowledges “the particular (svalakṣaṇa) as ultimately real.” Dharmakīrti’s “non-apprehension” (anupalabdhi) can only negate existence at the conceptual level; it cannot touch the ultimate reality of the particular. Candrakīrti’s position is: “even in conventional discourse, no self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) is permitted.” Venerable Fazun explicitly states: “All those who accept that dharmas possess self-characteristics as ultimately real are called ‘substantialists.’ The Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Yogācārins all belong to this category. … Those who do not permit dharmas to possess self-characteristics even in conventional discourse are only Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.”
Therefore, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory and Candrakīrti’s deconstructive strategy share the “operative mode of negation,” not the ultimate position that “all dharmas are without self-nature.” To over-align the two is an expedient requiring apophasis. In critiquing the “affirmative turn,” this paper takes Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s “pure negation” as a reference point, but does not equate it with Madhyamaka’s negation. The function of this reference is limited: it serves to reveal the fact of “negation being co-opted by affirmation,” not to establish the thesis that “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are Madhyamakas.”
III. Śāntarakṣita’s Turn: How Negation Is Co-opted
Śāntarakṣita’s “affirmative apoha theory” formally presents itself as a re-description of the apoha mechanism: the primary function of a word is not to “exclude others,” but to produce a “positive image” (ākāra/pratibimba) in cognition; “exclusion” is not an independently operating negative act, but is “cognized concomitantly by way of logical implication” after the positive image is understood.
Śāntarakṣita’s turn has its own internal logic. As a thinker attempting to synthesize Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, Śāntarakṣita establishes in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra the fundamental position that “all dharmas are without self-nature, like an image.” Within this framework, the “image” conveyed by words is structurally analogous to the “illusory” (māyā) spoken of in Madhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita thereby argues that the image “presented” through negation by words precisely accords with Madhyamaka’s description of “illusory manifestation” in conventional truth.
However, the cost of this turn is enormous. From the standpoint of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, apoha’s critical force lies precisely in its refusal to acknowledge that words “present” anything. The “this” “designated” by “excluding others” is never an “image” that can be positively grasped, but merely the negative fact of “the non-existence of others.” Śāntarakṣita’s elevation of “image” to the primary meaning of words means that words regain a certain “presentational function”—even if this presentation is confined to the conventional level of “illusoriness,” it still provides a “seat” (ālambana) for conceptual cognition to abide in.
Candrakīrti’s critique of Yogācāra in Chapter Six of the Madhyamakāvatāra has precisely this as its core thesis: any system grounded in “consciousness” (vijñāna), no matter how much it emphasizes the delusiveness of “consciousness,” inevitably bestows upon “consciousness” a certain status of “enduring selfhood,” thereby preventing practitioners from thoroughly eliminating subtle attachments to reality. Although Śāntarakṣita’s “image” concept is situated at the conventional level, once the boundary between conventional and ultimate truth is filled by “image,” the path from conventional truth to ultimate truth is no longer the thorough negation of “deconstruction,” but becomes a transition “from one image to another image.”
Tsongkhapa’s critique of the “Chinese monk” (Hva-shang) in the Lam rim chen mo has a structurally referential significance here. Tsongkhapa points out that the Chinese monk’s fault lies in “not distinguishing between ’the mistaken conceptualization of true grasping and the correct conceptualization of valid mental engagement.’” Tsongkhapa’s position is: correct conceptualization—understanding the meaning-universal (artha-sāmānya) of emptiness through conceptual cognition—is the only expedient by which ordinary beings can enter emptiness. “Relying on ‘conceptual cognition’ to understand the ‘meaning-universal’ of ’emptiness’ is the only expedient by which ordinary beings can enter emptiness.” But Tsongkhapa simultaneously strictly limits the scope of this correct conceptualization: “Repeatedly analyzing with conceptual wisdom is only appropriate during the stages of hearing and reflection; when seeking the wisdom of cultivation, it should not be so.”
Śāntarakṣita’s “affirmative apoha” deviates from the critical spirit of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti precisely at this point. It believes that by “implying” negation within affirmation, it can both preserve the function of negation and bestow upon words a certain “presentational” order. But once negation is “implied,” it loses its primacy as a critical tool. Negation is no longer a “dissolving” force, but an auxiliary to “construction.” This is the first step of “co-optation.”
IV. The “Similar” and “Induce” of Āśraya-parāvṛtti: The Middle Way of Neither Identical Nor Different
The third stage—represented by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti—of “negation-qualified affirmation” formally presents itself as the “dialectical unity” of the first two stages: apoha is “a conceptual image as qualified by the negation of the opposite entities.” In this formulation, “conceptual image” is the affirmative element, and “the negation of others” is the qualifying element. However, the substance of this “unity” remains an affirmative framework, in which the position of negation is further marginalized.
The deeper problem of this transformation lies in its conflation of the description of conceptual operations in conventional truth with the deconstruction of conceptual construction in ultimate truth. More fundamentally, it conflates the distinction between “dominant condition” (adhipati-pratyaya) and “direct cause” (kāraṇa-hetu).
The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in discussing non-conceptual wisdom, makes a key distinction. The text explicitly states that non-conceptual wisdom has three kinds: “First, the non-conceptual wisdom of preparation (prayoga-nirvikalpa-jñāna), which is conceptual wisdom (cintāmayī prajñā); second, fundamental non-conceptual wisdom (mūla-nirvikalpa-jñāna), which is the wisdom of direct realization; third, subsequently attained non-conceptual wisdom (pṛṣṭha-labdha-nirvikalpa-jñāna).” Venerable Yin Shun explains in his Lecture Notes on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: “The wisdom of preparation performs a ‘similar’ non-conceptual contemplation, which can ‘induce’ fundamental wisdom; from the perspective of what is induced, it is also called non-conceptual.” The relationship here is clear: the wisdom of preparation is the cause of fundamental wisdom, but the wisdom of preparation itself is not fundamental wisdom; the wisdom of preparation is “conceptual wisdom,” a “conceptual” operation, while fundamental wisdom is “the wisdom of direct realization,” a “non-conceptual” attainment.
However, the two terms “induce” and “similar” precisely suggest that the wisdom of preparation and fundamental wisdom are not absolutely ruptured. “Performs a similar non-conceptual contemplation”—the word “similar” both preserves continuity (it is “like” non-conceptual wisdom) and preserves rupture (it is “not” non-conceptual wisdom). This is precisely the structure of “neither identical nor different”: the wisdom of preparation and fundamental wisdom are not the same thing, but they are also not two utterly different things.
The more fundamental issue lies in the rupture implied by the Yogācāra concept of “transformation of the basis” (āśraya-parāvṛtti). The Triṃśikā states: “The supramundane wisdom, inconceivable and non-obtaining, abandons the two heavynesses and thereby realizes the transformation of the basis.” The Cheng Weishi Lun explicitly defines “transformation of the basis” as “abandoning the defiled and attaining the pure”—“The noble path transforms and causes the abandonment of the defiled and the attainment of the pure.” This is not “different levels of the same mind,” but the transformation of the basis—“The basis is the support, namely the dependent nature (paratantra) as the support for defiled and pure dharmas. The defiled is the imagined nature (parikalpita) of false conceptualization. The pure is the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna) of reality. Transformation means the abandoning and attaining of these two aspects.”
But does “transformation of the basis” mean there is absolutely no continuity between the wisdom of preparation and fundamental wisdom? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says the wisdom of preparation “performs a similar non-conceptual contemplation, which can induce fundamental wisdom.” “Similar” and “induce” precisely suggest a continuity—the wisdom of preparation, though not fundamental wisdom, is a “similar” non-conceptual contemplation. The relationship between seed and sprout is not “the seed matures into the sprout” (progress narrative), nor is it “the seed and sprout are absolutely ruptured” (rupture narrative), but “the seed ceases and the sprout arises”—between cessation and arising, there is neither identity nor rupture. This is precisely the middle way of dependent origination.
V. The Conceptual and the Non-Conceptual: The Double Apophasis of the “Consistency” Thesis and the “Rupture” Thesis
The thesis of “the ultimate consistency of the conceptual and the non-conceptual,” if properly qualified, has profound Buddhist philosophical grounds. From the perspective of essence and function, fundamental wisdom is the essence, subsequently attained wisdom is the function. Subsequently attained wisdom is “conceptual yet undefiled”; it arises dependent on fundamental wisdom and comprehends the myriad phenomena of the dependent nature. From the perspective of the two truths, the validity of all verbal conventions in conventional truth depends on conceptualization; without conceptualization, there is no establishment of conventional truth.
However, this thesis undergoes three logical slides in the “progress narrative.”
First slide: from “non-duality” to “identity.” The usage of “consistency” in the progress narrative is ambiguous. It sometimes refers to “non-duality”—the conceptual and the non-conceptual are not absolutely opposed; sometimes it slides toward “identity”—the conceptual and the non-conceptual are “different levels of the same mind.” Non-duality is a tenable thesis, but identity is not. If the conceptual and the non-conceptual are “different levels of the same mind,” then transformation of the basis becomes “self-upgrading of the same mind,” rather than “transformation of the support.”
Second slide: from “apophatic definition” to “cataphatic description.” The Mahāyānasaṃgraha defines the nature of non-conceptual wisdom as “free from five aspects.” The text explicitly states: “Among the five aspects, if non-attention were non-conceptual wisdom, then deep sleep, indulgence in sexual pleasure, and extreme intoxication should be non-conceptual wisdom.” This is an apophatic definition. It speaks of what non-conceptual wisdom is “free from,” not what it “is.” Interpreting “free from five aspects” as “the essence of conceptual cognition” repackages apophasis as cataphasis.
Third slide: from “dominant condition” to “direct cause.” Conceptual cognition is indeed a dominant condition for understanding “what non-conceptual wisdom is”—without concepts, we could not even understand the word “non-conceptual wisdom.” But a dominant condition is not a direct cause. The actualization of non-conceptual wisdom has as its direct cause the transformation of the basis, not the “maturation” of conceptual cognition.
However, if the critique of the above three slides substitutes “rupture,” it falls into another slide: from “non-duality” to “duality,” from “apophatic definition” to “nihilistic definition,” from “dominant condition is not direct cause” to “dominant condition and direct cause are absolutely unrelated.”
Nāgārjuna refutes the four extremes in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: “neither existence, nor non-existence, nor both existence and non-existence, nor neither existence nor non-existence.” The progress narrative falls into “both existence and non-existence” (there is maturation, there is continuity); the rupture narrative falls into “neither existence nor non-existence” (no maturation, no continuity). But Nāgārjuna’s fourfold negation is not intended to establish a “correct” position, but to deconstruct all positions, including “neither identical nor different” itself.
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “Whatever is dependently originated, I say is emptiness; it is also a provisional designation; it is also the meaning of the middle way.” Emptiness, provisional designation, and the middle way are not three things, but threefold expressions of the same reality. The function of conceptual cognition in conventional truth and the attainment of non-conceptual wisdom in ultimate truth are neither “rupture” nor “identity,” but “neither identical nor different.” “Neither identical nor different” itself is not a position that can be grasped. When “neither identical nor different” is proclaimed as an ultimate position, it has already slid from “apophasis” to “cataphasis.” This is precisely where this paper requires self-apophasis.
VI. Conclusion: The Double Self-Apophasis of the Critical Dimension
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this paper: is it possible that describing the three-stage evolution of apoha theory as the “maturation of conceptual cognition” is a “regression”?
This paper’s examination shows that this description constitutes a systematic co-optation of Buddhist critical spirit on three levels. On the Madhyamaka level, it transforms Candrakīrti’s thorough deconstruction of “only refutation, no establishment; only negation, no positive predication” into a limited deconstruction of “attached conceptualization.” On the Yogācāra level, it substitutes the “transformation of the support” of āśraya-parāvṛtti with “the upgrading of levels of the same mind.” On the epistemological level, it repackages the apophatic definition of “free from five aspects” from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha as a cataphatic description.
However, this paper itself must also be subject to apophasis. This paper’s critique of the “progress narrative” may itself fall into the extreme of the “rupture narrative.” If “rupture” is absolutized, if “pure negation” is constructed as a benchmark, if Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are over-aligned with Candrakīrti, then the critique itself becomes a new “cataphasis.”
Nāgārjuna’s declaration in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Chapter on the Analysis of the Dharma, has ultimate judgmental significance here: “The ultimate reality of all dharmas is the cessation of mental activity and verbal expression.” “Mental activity” is the operation of conceptualization; “verbal expression” is conceptual construction. The attainment of ultimate reality is not the result of the “maturation” of conceptual cognition, nor the result of its “rupture,” but the result of the “cessation” of mental activity and verbal expression. Cessation is neither “maturation” nor “rupture.” Cessation is simply cessation.
If the historical unfolding of apoha theory has any “lesson,” it may be precisely this: any attempt to grasp “apoha” conceptually inevitably falls back into the trap of “cataphasis.” The “progress” of the three-stage narrative is not the victory of the negating spirit, but the restoration of the affirming spirit. But this paper’s critique of the “progress narrative” is itself a “narrative about apoha”—it too requires apophasis.
The necessity of conceptual cognition must be qualified as “dominant condition” rather than “direct cause”; the “consistency” of the conceptual and the non-conceptual must be qualified as “non-duality” rather than “identity”; “rupture” must be qualified as rupture within “similarity” rather than absolute rupture. Beyond these qualifications, the critical dimension closes in upon itself. And the self-closure of the critical dimension is precisely what Buddhist philosophy must most guard against—for the mechanism of saṃsāra lies not in “erroneous cognition,” but in cognition’s forgetting of its own limits.
Ultimately, this paper and the “progress narrative” it critiques are both expedients in conventional truth. They each target different attachments: the progress narrative targets the anxiety of “rupture,” while this paper targets the attachment to “progress.” Both require apophasis; both require relinquishment. And “relinquishment” itself is not an event that can be established. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: “The ultimate reality of all dharmas is the cessation of mental activity and verbal expression.” Even the act of “relinquishment” requires deconstruction.
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